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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
GooDYEAR TIRE AND R-UBBER CoM-
PANY, a corporation, and HART-
FORD AcciDENT AND INDEMNITY 
CoMPANY, a corporati~on, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL CoMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH and LEE 
JAMES HARRIS, 
Defenda;nts. 
Case No. 6250 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF 
J Counsel for defendants w·ould have it appear that 
paintiffs are attacking in thi~s court the findings made hy 
the Industrial Commission. Not only is such not our 
position, but we desire it ;clearly understood at the out-
set of this brief that pla.intif:f:is ~do not question the estab-
lished rule referred to by defendants that if there is 
substantial and compe'tent evidence to support the find-
ings of the :Co:rnmi.ssion, that the .court will not disturb 
such findings. It logically follows, therefore, that the 
ea~se's ei ted and discussed by defendants to this effect 
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are beside the issue in this cas-e. .Si~mply stated, the 
issue is: Under the material undisp.uted facts of this 
oase, was the Industrial c·ommiiS'Sion justified in conclud-
ing as a matter of la,w from such facts that the applicant 
was injured in an accident artising out of or in the course 
of his e-mployn1ent ~ 
It is of ·course obvious that the ruling of the Indus-
tri~al Commission that the accident to the applicant o~­
curred while in the eourise of his em~ployment is not a 
finding of fact but a conclusion of law from the facts, 
which conclusion we submit is contrary to law he-cause 
not warranted by the facts. The only finding in the de-
·cision of the Industrial ·Commission as to how the acci-
dent occurred is the foHowing: 
''Being required to work overtime, the ap-
plicant rode a m·otor cycle owned by the Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber C·ompany to his hom·e for dinner, 
and was accidentally injured on the return trip, 
the motor cycle bec,ame unmanageable, left the 
road, and crashed into the side of a private 
residence.'' 
What the connection is between being required to 
work overtim·e and riding a motor cycle to his ·home to 
get dinner does not a~ppea.r, be1cause it obviously is the 
fact that he was .injured not while working overtime and 
doing somHthing for his employer, but while on an errand 
of his own. 
There is therefore no dispute as to wher-e the ap-
plicant was or what he was d)oing ~a.t the tim-e of ~h:e 
a:ccident. 
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Plaintiffs do not complain of any finding of fa·ct 
made by the Comnrission, hut do say .most emphatirally 
that the con·clusion of law drawn by the Commission 
from such findings of fa·ct is eontra.ry to law and is not 
warranted by the evidence. 
C-ouns-el for defendants, in a.n effort to show that 
the applicant \Yas con1sidered by the employer to be on 
the payroll "up to the very ins'tant of the injury,'' c.alls 
attention to what is attached to a letter (Item 7 of the 
record) and states, "This time sheet . . . apparently 
shows that $·3.28 is due applicant for ten and one-half 
hours-from '5-7 to 5-13-39','' and then follows this with 
the statement that '·'P'resumably the ten and one-half 
hours is for the regular shift up to six-thirty o 'clo:ck 
and two and one-half hours overtime thereafter on May 
8, 193-9." Examination .of this so-called "time sheet" 
(·submitted as -c-ounsel says two months after the aeci-
dent) does not indi-cate that the ten and one-half hours 
therein referred to was for work on the da.te of the acci-
dent, to-wit: May 8, 1939, but indi0ates only that there 
was due the applicant pay for ten and one-half hours 
from" 5-7 to 5-13-39,'' undoubtedly the houf!s unpaid for 
for tha·t period of six da.y.s, just as it is stated therein. 
It is ·evident that.- the record d·nes not bear out the pre-
sumption, or rather, the pure ·conje-cture engaged in by 
counsel, whtich if established as a fact rather than a mere 
surmise would he wholly immate-rial to any issue involved 
in 'this oas·e. We fail to s·ee how such an unexeeuted 
receipt would in any wise· aid the case of the applicant, 
even if it showed that on the day of the a,ccident he 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
had received credit for ten and one-half hours work, or 
even mo·re. 
As p·ointed out in our opening brief, the accident to 
the ~applicant happ·ened a.way fr:om the employer's prem-
ises, whoHy disconne-cted from his busine-ss, and at a 
time when the employer had no control and dire-ction 
over the applicant. At that time, :he was performing no 
service for his employer and he was neither required nor 
dire-cted to go home for his .supper nnr to use the em-
ployer's motor ;cycle for that purpose. 
D~ef.end~ants state in their brief that they do not 
challenge the well-established ''going and coming rule.'' 
However, they ~seek to avoid its application to this ease 
by reference t.o cases in which, .due to the pe-culiar facts 
in ea~eh of them, such rule is not appli0able. In the cas-es 
eited by defendants, the accident resulted from a. risk 
or hazard which was n·eces.sa.rily or ordinarily or reason-
ably inherent or incident to the work of the employee, 
which is· not the situation in the cruse at bar. 
The case ·of Cud·a:hy Packing Company v. Ind. Com., 
60 ·ufa.h 161, 207 P. 148, is easily distinguishable from 
the instant case. In that .case the employee, in order to 
reach his pl,ace of employment, was obliged tn cross the 
railroad tracks which bore so intimate a relation to the 
packing ·company'(s premi~ses that it could hardly be 
trea t.ed ias otJ'Lerwis.e than a.s a .part of the premises. The 
court· said at page 170: 
''Conceding that the w·eight of authority 
denies to an employee the right to compensation 
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for an injury received while on his \vay to or 
from his employment, the question here, in its 
final ~analysis, i's: Did the particular facts sur-
rounding this accident make this case an excep-
tion to the holdings of the courts~'' 
·This ·court further said: 
"It \Yas customary, in fact absolutely neces-
sary, for employees going to the plant to work 
to pass over and acrOIS'S these railroad tracks on 
the public road where the accident happened. N·o 
other means or· way existed by which employees 
could get to the plant. * * * If there is lia-
lbility for the injury under .consideration, it must 
be founded upon the inferable fa;ct that the dHn-
ger incident to crossing this railroad track, by 
reason of its location and proximity to the pack-
ing plant, must be held to have been within the 
contemplation of the parties at the date of the 
employment.'' 
The case of Hobson v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 
(Wash.) 27 P. (2d) 1091, cited by defendants is likewise 
an exception to the general rule and s-o not in point, as 
i1S clearly demonstrated by the following syllabus there·in: 
''Death of watchman who wa!s on duty 24 
hours daily and who was required to furnish his 
own food, which wa.s caused wih.en speeder left 
track on way hack from crossing where watchman 
went for sup1ilies and mail, held eomp·ensable as 
'arising in ·course of employment'.'' 
The court said at page 10912: 
''Hi1s ·contract of employment required him 
to furnish his own fo,od supplies, and it was within 
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the ·Contemplation of that ·Contract that he call 
at the .crossing for such supplies. So, too, it was 
one of his duties to .call at nhat erossing for mail. 
The evidence i1s uncontradicted that he went to 
the crossing for both purposes. * * * ·The 
action of Hobson, procuring fnod supplies, was 
ne~cess'ary to the proper per'formHnce of his work, 
and ·constituted no interruption of the course of 
the employm.ent (twenty-four hours' duty daily 
as a wa:t·chman and genera1l repairman). Rill v. 
Department of Ltahor and Indu1stries, (Wash.) 
24 P. (2d) 9'5. Hence, Hobson was engaged in the 
furtheranee of the interests of his employer at 
the time of the fatal accident.'' 
·Obviously H;obson was in the .course of his employ-
ment,_ .and this ease in no way as~sists in the determination 
of the instant case. 
The case -cited by defendan1Js of Chandler v. Ind. 
Co~m., 55 Utalh 213, 184 P. 1020, sustains the position of 
the plaintiffs rather than that of the defendants. 
In that case the duties of the employee required him 
to go from his ho,me each morning to the garage and get 
his employer's delivery automobile, and drive it down 
to his employer's place of business, and to use it througJ!-
out the day in making deliveries of m.eat and groceries, 
·and return it tO' the garage at night after his day's work 
was finished. When he was unable to make all the de-
liveries of the day, he would bring with him to his ho1ne 
sueh unde'livered packages and make delivery of them 
on foot the following morning on his wa.y to the garage 
to get the car. 
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It ''Ta's alleged in the co~mplaint, .demurrer to whieh 
was sustained by the district court, that \vhile Chandler 
was ·on his way to the garage to get the automobile to 
begin making deliveries required of him as aforesaid, 
and while actually making delivery of mea.t for his em-
ployer \Yhieh \Yas undelivered the .evening before, he w~as 
attacked and bitten by a dog, resulting in hydrophobia, 
from which he died. 
Inasmuch a.s it i•s p·erfeetly clear that Chandler was 
performing ·a service for his ·employer at th.e time of 
the accident, the injury aros-e out of and in the course 
of his employment. Chandler's duties took and kept him 
on the streets, a risk ne·cessarily incid·ent to his employ-
ment, whether in the automobile or on foot, so that he 
us·ed the .streets in the regular course of his duties in 
making deliveries, the very servi-ce for whi:cih. he was 
employed. 
In the Chand'ler .case the employee was performing 
service for his ·employer. In the instant ease, Harris 
was !on a mis·sion wholly his own. 
D·ef.endants ·cite the· ease of Twin Peaks CGIJVYl,ing Co. 
v. Ind. Com., 57 Utah 589, 196 P. 853. T.hat this case is 
not in point is apparent from the· following quotation 
from the ~syllabus therein, ~lhowing that when an em-
ployee remains on the premises during working h~ours 
and moves about in an ina-ctive period within reasonable 
limits, visiting with fellow employees, he does not leave 
the -course of employment. 
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''Where 15 year :old hoy entering a freight 
elevator to return to his ;work from a. floor visited 
during an interval of leisure was killed by the 
movement of the elevator when he turned on the 
pow.er, previous~y shut off by himself as a joke 
on a ·Companion who was coming up and failed to 
disengage the .swi·tch on tlhe ·eleY.ator when it 
stopped between the floors, an a.ward under the 
Workmen's c·nmpensation Act was justified on 
the theory that the acident oc-curred 'in the cours·e 
of employment'." 
It is thus apparent from the foregoing that the a-cci-
dent occurred on the premises of the employer during a 
slack time, :but ·still within the working hours of the em-
ployee. Though the eourt held that the emplory·ee, a child 
of hut fourteen years of age, had not departed from the 
course of his employment be-cause of what he did on the 
premises during .a sla·ck period, the court said: 
"It is true that in some of its aspects this 
may .be a borderline ca.se, and if the deceased 
had been a man of mature years and expe-rience 
. we might have reached a different -conclusion." 
T!he actual age of the deceased was fourteen years, 
ten months at the time of his death. 
· The sweeping dictum referred to by the defendants 
in that ease, and quoted by them in their brief was not 
neces:sary to the de-cision of the ease. As counsel well 
said, this is not a ''going and coming'' ease, and is there-
fore of no help to the. de-cision of the question befo-re the 
court. 
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The case of Utah .. .4pex Mining Co. v. Ind. Com., 67 
Utah 537, 248 P. 490, is not in point for the reason that 
the protection of la \V extends tn a reasonable time and 
space for the emp'loyee to go to or leave the lncality or 
zone of his \York, and "~hile he i•s in proximity in ap-
proaching or leaving the place of his employment by the 
only means of acc.es·s thereto. In this .case it is o:bvious 
that the emplo~Tee was electrocuted on the premises of 
the employer within that reasona'ble time extended to 
employees to leave ·the zone of their work. No parallel 
exists between the facts of that case and the case under 
discussion. 
\\ .... hat the case of MacKay v. Department of La1bor 
and Industries, (Wa·sh.) 44 P·. (2d) 793, cited by defend-
ants has to do with the present ·Case is not clear. There 
the ·employe-e at. the time of injury was performing a 
service for his employ.er ne~essary and incident to his 
employment. As stated by defenda.nt·s, he had taken 
the broken parts of a .caterpillar to a. garage for repairs, 
and while at the garage he was injured. The distin-etion 
betw'een the MacKay case and this oase is that MacKay 
was at a pla.ce where his employment required him to be, 
and Harris, the app'licant herein, wa~s at a place of his 
own choosing, where his employment did not r·equire 
him to be. 
Where an injury results to an employee .a.t a place 
where the employm.ent neither required nor expected 
him to go, or in a plaee where his employm·ent should not 
take him, it ·Cannot be said to arise out of or in the course 
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of the. employment. Therein lies the distinction between 
the above case and the case at bar. 
The case of Gilmore v. Ring Canst. Co., (Mo.) 61 
S. W. (2d) 764, .cited by defe1ndants is not in point for the 
defendant·s, but rather clearly sustains plaintiffs' posi-
tion, as is shown by the following e~cerpt from the opin-
ion in that case: 
"H·e (the applicant) was doing what his fore-
man t-old ·,him to do that is, to wait on the job for 
development as to weather cO'nditions. Complain-
ant was ·obeying his master',s orders. He was as 
·much in his line of duty .as he would have been 
if pouring -cement. Complainant wa·s waiting at 
what may he inferred to be the a·ecustomed place, 
that is, around the fire with other employees; on 
this December morning. Being around· that fire 
and waiting was incident to his employment and 
·while so situa:te an accident occurred within the 
m·e·aning set out in the act." 
D:ef.endants cite the ease of Michaux, et a.Z., v. Gate 
City Orawt.ge, etc., C·o., ('N. C.) 172 S. E. 406, wherein a 
ne~ro hoy was injured while gett,ing on his employer's 
truck. That case is nO't appli·cable for the reasons stated 
in the opinion as follows : 
''Moreover hi~s services were necessary to the 
proper and efficient dist.ri;bution of the products 
of the employer. He w.as injured in attempting 
to climb upon the truck to which .he had been as-
signed in the prosecution of the .business of the 
owner. * * * The faet that previous to his 
injury he had heen playing ·or scuffling or spar-
ring with another boy does not preclude re.covery 
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upon the facts di·sclo·s-ed by the re.cord. Such facts 
'bore no relation to his fall from the truck and the 
consequent death.'' 
Defendants are in error when they state that the 
court in the a~boYe case ''ignores the fa.ct that he had 
left his employment for purposes of his own,'' because 
it is apparent from the fa·c:ts that he wa·s an a·ssista.nt 
to the truck driYer and th.erefoTe had to get on and off 
the truck, and that his plaee of employment was on the 
truck \Yhich he "~as getting· on at the time of his injury. 
Counsel for defendants have overlooked the point 
clearly recognized by the ·court that it \Yas not the s·cuffle 
that caused the injury, but getting onto the truck, which 
he had a right to do .and where he had a right to be. 
Reference is made by defendants to the ·Case of Texas 
Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 50 iS. W. (2d) 465, a Texas 
cas-e. This case is distinguishable from the instant case 
because the eompensation act in that state is much broad-
er and n1ore inclusive than our·s, as is shown by the fol-
lowing excerpt from the opinion in that case : 
'·'The Workmen's Compensation Law makes 
·eompensable all injuries, with ex-ceptions not ne;e-
es·sary to now notice,' of every kind and charac:ter 
having to do with and originating in the work, 
business, trade or profession of the employer 
re.ceived hy an employee while enga,ged in or about 
the furtherance of the affairs or business of his 
employer, whether upon the em·ployer's premises 
or elsewhere. * * *' '' 
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The holding in the a:bove case is justified only be-
cause ·of the foregoing language of the Texas statute. 
The above ca.se is further distinguishable from the 
case under consideration because of the peculiar facts 
involved therein. The employee w.as away from ho,me 
on a job. The eompany had no means of caring for its 
employees in the location of the work, and the applicant 
wa1s injured while in an effort to: se-cure a rooming place, 
none having been provided at the ·Camp. Since the Tex'as 
act makes .compensable all injuries originating in the 
work, the court said that securing a necessary rooming 
place was ineidental to and neee·ssary to his duty. 
Reference is made by defendants to the case of In-
dustrial Com. v. Murphy, ('Ohio) 197 N .. E. 505, invo'lving 
an accident to an employee of an undertaker. That ca,se 
is not applicable to the situation in the instant case, he-
eause there the employee wa.s, in effe-ct, on duty twenty-
four hours a. day, just :as in the case of the watchman 
cited by defendant·s, heTeinbef.ore referred to. The 
peculiar time and terms of employment of the under-
taker's assistant are illustrated by the following quota-
tion from the opinion in that case. 
"It wa.s necess·ary that he should at every 
mome;nt of the day and night keep his employer 
aware of where he might he reached by telephone, 
and it was a part of his contract of employment 
that immediately upon reeeiving call he- should 
repair at once to the funeral parlors ·Or ~such other 
place as might he- de)signa,ted ;by his employer. It 
is obvious that defendant in error had no regular 
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hours of employrnent. * * * It seems clear 
to us that there are rnany differen·c.es between the 
ease under consideration and wha.t is .commonly 
styled as 'coming~ and g~oing case' where the em-
ployee has a fixed time to appear a:t his employ-
er's place of residence. Up to the time the em-
ployee reaches such plaee he is his own master, 
can cho-ose his own route, en.gage in such private 
e-nterprises as he sees fit, take as much time as 
is consistent W'"ith reaching his place of employ-
ment in the stipulated time, start when and from 
where he chooses, and, after he leaves his pla·ce 
of ·employment, go where ih:e ple'ases, with no 
responsibility to advise his employer of his move-
ments. In the instant .ca,se it is perfe-ctly apparent 
that immediate-ly upon reeeiving the telephone 
-call it became the duty of the employee to go 
directly to his place of employment a.s rapidly 
and directly as he could. ' ' 
We have carefully read and reviHwed herein all of 
the cases eited by the defendants on this issue and it 
is obvious that none of them are applicable to the case 
at bar. 
In the re.cent case of Red Arrow· Bon.ded Messenger 
Corp. v. Ind. Ace. Com., 103 P·. (2d) 1004, ·a :California 
case, a messenger hoy, after delivering a message de-
viated from the dire:ct route to his employer's office by 
going home to ge·t some food, and after eating started 
back to the office and was injured en route. The court 
said: 
''The petitioner corn tends that the deviation to 
procure .a meal having been unauthorized and 
contrary to ins·truetions, it can not he held to have 
been wi:thin the S·cope of his employment, and that 
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the injuries did not arise out of or in the .course 
of his employment. We are in aceord with th~ 
position taken by the petitioneT. * * * The 
award is annulled.'' 
In the ·Case of Fidelity .a;nd Casualty Co. v. Ind. Ac'C. 
Com., 19~2 P. 16.6, the 0ourt said at page 167: 
''·The ques·tion for decision is tersely stated 
hy counsel for petitione-r~s as follows: 'Should 
.compens'ati~on be awarded to an employee who, 
p.urely for his own purposes, leaves his place of 
employment before his day's work is fini·shed 
and, several hours later. is injured upon the pub-
lic streek when returning to hi~s place of work~' '' 
The eourt quoted from the leading ca,se of Ocean 
Accident, etc., Co. v. Ind. Ace. Com., 173 Cal. 313, 159 
P. 1041, and ·Concluded its opinion with the following 
Htatement: 
''The sole claimed purpose of his intended 
return to the garage was for the performance of 
duties .at that place, which weTe such duties a·s 
were ordinarily performed by him when on duty 
a~t the gara1ge. -The ·Conclusion ne-cessarily fol-
lows that the employee's injuries were not re-
reeived at a time w;hen he wa.s performing service 
for his employer or .acting within the course of 
his employment. 
''The award is annulled.'' 
In the- .case of Cal. Cas. Ind. Ex. v. Ind. Ace. Com., 
213 P. 257, it appeared that the driveT of a truck was. 
killed while eros sing the s1treet after hav:ing obtained 
lunch in a place wh·ere his duties did not call him, the 
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employer permitting him to take his lune:h ·"r,here and 
·when he desired. The court said at page 258 : 
'·'In the very broadest sense, of eourse, it is 
true that the injury to the decedent grew out of 
and \Yas incidental to his employment, since it 
\vas necessarY that he should return fr-om the 
place where he lunched to the truck. The right 
to an a.\Yard is not alone founded upon the fact 
that such is the case, but upon the fa·et that the 
service the employee is rendering ·at the time of 
the injury grows out of and is incidenl1al to the 
en1ploynzeut. F:or instanc.e, it is the rule that an 
employee going to and from his place of employ-
ment is not rendering any serviee, and hegins to 
render such service only vvhen he arrives at the 
place of h~s employment, and proceeds to use 
some instrumentality provided, by means of which 
he immediately places himself in a position to 
perform his task. Ocean A!ccident, et·e., Co. v. 
Ind. Ace. Comm., 173 Cal. 313, 32;2, 1519 P. 1041, 
L. R. A. 1917B 336. It was not intended bv the 
Compensation A·ct that the employer who ~omes 
within its provisions shall be the insurer of his 
employee at all times during the period of his 
employment.'' 
The court in that case then quoted with approval 
the following language from the case of In re Betts, 118 
N. E. 5·51: 
''We understand that all of these cas'es reeog-
nize and in ~ffect hold that: 'It is not enough for 
the applicant to ~say, "The accident would not 
have happened if I had not been engage~d in that 
e·mployment, or if I ha.d not been at that parti-
cular place.'' He must go further and must say, 
''The accident arose because of something I was 
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doing in the course of my employment, or because 
I was exposed by the nature of my employment 
to some particular danger.'' ' '' 
In answer to what was said in our opening brief with 
respect to there being no evidence whatever in the record 
of any permanent injury to the applicant, the defendants 
refer to the report of Dr. C. L. Shields, attending physi-
cian, ·of date ·May 18, 193~9, ( tr. 3) which, made out on the 
regular surgieal report blank of the Industrial c·ommis-
sion, de·scrihes only the injuries and the tre·a tment given, 
and which, in reply to the item No. 6 thereon, "Will any 
permanent injury or deformity resulf~ If so, to what 
extent~'' is followed by a question mark. Certainly this 
report, together with the fact that the applicant appeared 
in pers-on before the Commission as counsel says, does 
not afford any evidence whatsoever, much les·s the re-
quired substantial evidence, of any permanent injury. 
The· attending physician did not testify, and there is no 
hasis whatever for the gratuitous :finding that the ap-
plicant ''now suffers some .permanent partial loss of the 
use of hi·s left leg below the knee.'' 
''An a~ward must he based upon evidence 
which fairly proves the extent or per·centage of 
disability; and where a preponderance ·Of the evi-
dence shows that the disability was not to the 
extent for whireh the award was granted, it must 
·be reversed. Bh~,sicians' opinions are ordinarily 
of great weight in de1termining an injured em-
ployee 's physical {}Ondition, and where the injury 
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or disability is of a character requiring profes-
sional skill to determine the extent thereof, the 
question must necessarily he determined by the 
testin1ony of expert medical \Yitnesses. On the 
issue of the permanence of the di,sa'bility, the evi-
dence on \Yhich the .c:onclusion is based that it 
\Yas permanent should not he a mere conje.c:ture 
or surmise, but the conclusion should be a legiti-
nlate ·One from .competent eVlidence, although doubt 
-as to the date of the employee's recovery will be 
resolved in his favor. Further an a\vard for 
permanent total disability must be based on ·com-
petent evidence, and cannot rest on conje-cture or 
surmise, and the testimony must he such as to 
support the legitimate con.clusion of such dis-
a·bility." 
71 C. J. 1132. 
'' T,he award or judgment in compensation 
proceedrings must ·Conform to the evidence and be 
based on it; and an award made on a finding that 
i~s not sustained by the evidence is contrary to 
law·.'' 
71 C. J. 1188. 
vVe pref,a·ced our remarks herein with reference to 
the f-act that the de-cision herein, if logically carried out 
would render the empl·oyer liable to third persons, with 
a statement that ''driscussion of the above point, while 
not strictly pertinent to the ·c,ase at har, is vital because 
an incorrect decision of the instant case'' would produce 
absurd results. We did not ask this ·court for any ruling 
in advance on such a question, as counsel would inter-
prc\t our remarks, but ·merely pointed out the incongruity 
of such a s~ituation. Therefore defendants' comment 
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upon the ''moot case'' is wholly foreign to the ISsue 
herein. 
In conclusion it is earnestly urged that the Indus-
trial Commis·sion erred in its .c-onclusion as to the legal 
effect of the undisputed evidence in this case, and that 
it should have followed the law establi·shed by this Court 
in the ease of Fidelity Q.asualty C ompavny v. C ommis·sion., 
79 Utah 189, 8 P. (2d) 617, and therefore the award 
herein of the Industrial ·C-ommission should be annulled 
and set aside·. 
Respe.ctfully submitted, 
ELIAS L. DAY, 
CHARLES WELCH, JR. 
ARTHUR E. MoRETON, 
Attorneys for PlaWntiffs. 
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